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ALD-038        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2758 
___________ 
 
ADAM WENZKE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PAOLA MUNOZ, Mental Health Director, in her Official and Individual Capacity;  
MENTAL HEALTH DOCTOR SUSAN MUMFORD;  
CONNECTIONS, in their Official Capacity;  
MENTAL HEALTH DOCTOR MOSES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-00299) 
District Judge:  Honorable Maryellen Noreika 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 7, 2019 
 
Before:  MCKEE, SHWARTZ and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: February 6, 2020) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Adam Wenzke, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
order dismissing his amended complaint for failure to state a claim.  Because this appeal 
does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
Wenzke is a Delaware state prisoner at the James T. Vaugh Correctional Center 
(“JTVCC”).  His amended complaint presented claims against the defendants under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 
state law.  He primarily alleged that the defendants refused to provide him with the 
medications he knows to be most effective for his bipolar disorder, depression, and 
anxiety.  Wenzke also claimed that one defendant prescribed Cymbalta, which caused 
intolerable side effects (such as night sweats, involuntary movements, and severe 
restlessness) and otherwise failed to manage his symptoms.  He further alleged that 
another defendant refused to treat the side effects of Cymbalta as well as Wenzke’s 
underlying conditions.  Additionally, Wenzke alleged that the prison’s mental health 
director failed to respond to his requests for treatment, and that his mental healthcare 
providers never disclosed the potential side effects of long-term medication use.1 
Thereafter, the defendants moved to dismiss Wenzke’s amended complaint for 
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District 
 
1 Wenzke’s complaint expressed his concern that his symptoms reflect one or more 
tardive syndromes, which are neurological disorders that affect some people who have 
taken anti-psychotic drugs for a long time.  See Am. Complaint ¶ 19 and Exhibit C, ECF 
No. 15. 
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Court granted the defendants’ motion, finding that Wenzke’s allegations did not implicate 
the Eighth Amendment and that his ADA claims failed as a matter of law.  The District 
Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wenzke’s state law claims and 
ruled that further amendment would be futile. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss.  Fleisher v. Standard Ins. 
Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  Dismissal is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable 
to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  We review the District Court’s decision to 
refrain from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Wenzke’s state law claims for an 
abuse of discretion.  Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 The District Court correctly dismissed Wenzke’s Eighth Amendment claims.  To 
state an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege acts or omissions by prison 
officials that indicate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.  Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 
575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).  A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference by establishing 
that the defendants “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] access to medical care.”  Estelle, 
429 U.S. at 104–05.  However, “[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention 
and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally 
reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound 
in state tort law.”  United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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 Although Wenzke did not receive the medication he requested, by his own 
account, he was not denied medical care.  Rather, his allegations indicate that he received 
medical attention on numerous occasions and in direct response to his complaints.  For 
example, Wenzke alleged that one defendant agreed to stop prescribing him Cymbalta at 
his request, and a dentist examined him after he requested a mouthguard to address his 
teeth-grinding (a purported side effect of the Cymbalta).2  Even if Wenzke’s allegations 
could rise to the level of negligence, simple negligence cannot support an Eighth 
Amendment claim.  See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.  Because the individual defendants did 
not violate Wenzke’s constitutional rights, he did not state a claim against the corporate 
medical provider.3  See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583–84 (holding that corporations can only be 
held liable with evidence that there was “a relevant [corporate] policy or custom, and that 
the policy caused the [alleged] constitutional violation”).   
Likewise, the District Court was correct to hold that Wenzke’s claims were not 
properly brought under the ADA.  See Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 
2013) (describing requirements for prima facie case under Title II of the ADA); Burger v. 
Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (concluding that a lawsuit 
 
2 Wenzke’s allegation that prison healthcare practitioners failed to warn him about the 
possibility of tardive syndrome does not rise to the level of “deliberate indifference” 
required by Estelle.  See 429 U.S. 104–05.  Moreover, as Wenzke claimed to have been 
diagnosed with and treated for various mental illnesses long before he was transferred to 
JTVCC, it is unclear whether the defendants would bear the professional responsibility to 
issue such a warning. 
 
3 Also, Wenzke’s complaint failed to identify a relevant policy or custom. 
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under the ADA “cannot be based on medical treatment decisions”).  Wenzke also did not 
allege any facts that could constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 
As Wenzke failed to state a claim regarding his federal causes of action, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Wenzke’s state law claims for 
lack of supplemental jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer 
Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).  Finally, the District Court did not err in its 
refusal to grant Wenzke leave to again amend his complaint, as such amendment would 
be futile.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will affirm.  Wenzke’s 
motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155–56 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
